Hart publishes book with UT Law professor’s chapter on leniency policies

Anti-cartel law enforcement has been greatly aided by the sharp rise in leniency policies over the past decade. However, University of Tennessee College of Law Professor Maurice Stucke deviates from this sentiment arguing that corporate and individual leniency policies have not optimally deterred cartels.
September 8, 2015 2:02 pm

Stucke, MauriceAnti-cartel law enforcement has been greatly aided by the sharp rise in leniency policies over the past decade. However, University of Tennessee College of Law Professor Maurice Stucke deviates from this sentiment arguing that corporate and individual leniency policies have not optimally deterred cartels.

Stucke outlines this argument in his chapter, “Leniency, Whistle-Blowing and the Individual: Should We Create Another Race to the Competition Agency?” part of Anti-Cartel Enforcement in a Contemporary Age, published this month by Hart Publishing, Oxford.

He argues, for example, that financial incentives, which are a key component of many contemporary leniency policies, may not create effective whistle-blowing policies.

“Competition authorities cannot assume that money motivates whistle-blowing or that offering some money will yield better quality tips than offering no money at all,” said Stucke. “Financial incentives will work only if the amount is very large, which for prosecutors raises issues about the whistle-blowers’ credibility at trial.

Stucke brought 13 years of litigation experience when he joined the UT Law faculty in 2007. He presently serves as a Senior Fellow at the American Antitrust Institute, an independent Washington, D.C.-based non-profit education, research, and advocacy organization devoted to competition policy.